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ARTICLE
Organizational strategy and its implications for 
strategic studies: A review essay
Jeffrey Hughesa, Martin Kornbergerb, Brad MacKaya, Phillips O’Briena 
and Sneha Reddya
aManagement Studies and International Relations, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK; 
bDepartment of Management University of Edinburgh Business School, United Kingdom and 
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria
ABSTRACT
In this review essay, we investigate how organisational strategy can help refresh 
traditional strategic and security studies debates. Despite their shared history, 
both disciplines have evolved in silos, lacking interdisciplinary engagement. To 
foster dialogue and mutual learning, the paper uses four key themes familiar to 
‘Clausewitzian’ strategic studies – ends, ways, means, and friction – and intro-
duces key thoughts of contemporary organisational strategy that engage with 
these themes. Drawing on a specific school of organisational strategy – the 
Strategy as Practice (SAP) approach – we attempt to broaden the vocabulary of 
strategic studies. We conclude with implications for future research as well as 
some critical, practical applications that result from the interdisciplinary 
encounter between organisational strategy and security studies.
KEYWORDS Interdisciplinary strategic studies; strategy implementation; business strategy; manage-
ment; strategy as practice
Introduction
Strategy, as conventionally understood in the field of strategic and security 
studies, is concerned with the preparation and waging of war or the conduct 
of foreign policy. Modern strategic studies usually focuses on state-centred, 
conflict-ridden scenarios. Conversations in strategic studies exist in a silo and 
interact little, if at all, with one of the more dynamic areas in the study of 
strategy – modern management studies and, more specifically, organisational 
strategy. In this paper we argue that this lack of engagement is a lost 
opportunity on several levels. The two disciplines share original seminal 
texts such as the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu’s The Art of War written 
around 2500 years ago, or the 4th century BCE Greek writer Tacticus’ How to 
Survive Under Siege. In the wake of the disruptive Napoleonic Wars, the 
Prussian general and military thinker Carl von Clausewitz even suggested 
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comparing war ‘to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and 
activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as 
a kind of commerce on a larger scale’.1 More recently, US Army General 
Stanley McChrystal framed his strategic approach in the language of Silicon 
Valley start-ups when he identified ‘management’ as the biggest limiting 
factor in his attempt to fight non-hierarchical, decentralised and networked 
insurgents in Iraq.2
Yet, despite shared origins, what is missing is a dialogue and exchange of 
ideas on strategy and strategy-making between strategic and security studies 
on the one hand and organisational strategists on the other. In this review 
essay, we want to capitalise on this opportunity by (1) providing a review of 
organisational strategy literature and (2) bringing it to bear on strategic and 
security studies. We suggest that organisational strategy has developed 
a range of concepts and understandings of how strategy works. This has 
the potential to help critically examine strategic studies more generally. In 
particular, the Strategy as Practice (hereafter SAP) approach, a result of 
decades of empirical analyses of the strategy process, is chipping away at 
the dichotomy between planning and implementation by engaging with 
strategy as an emergent phenomenon in which implementation forms part 
of a dynamic co-creation process. One way to engage in conversation 
between SAP and strategic studies is to enquire what ground SAP has in 
common with the traditional, Clausewitzian vision of strategy and conflict. 
For instance, considerable military literature engages with the fundamental 
questions of the employment of Means in certain Ways to achieve specific 
Ends.3 This is what strategic thinker Colin Gray referred to as the ‘enduring 
nature’ of strategy and is the main paradigm through which state strategy is 
evaluated today.4 Historian Hew Strachan has written that strategy ‘is 
a profoundly pragmatic business; it is about applying means to ends’.5 
Indeed, for Strachan, it is the relationship between these factors that deter-
mines the ultimate value of a particular strategy. He is particularly critical of 
US strategy in the ‘War on Terror’, in a way that McChrystal might sympathise, 
because the lack of clarity in the intended ends provided such a poor context 
for utilising means – rendering the entire strategy ‘illiterate’.6
1Carl von Clausewitz, On War ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1832/1989), 149.
2Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York: 
2015), 32.
3Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Clausewitz’s Concept of Strategy – Balancing Purpose, Aims and Means’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies 37/6–7 (2014), 903–25.
4Colin Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: 2010), 6–7.
5Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: 2013), 
12.
6Strachan, The Direction of War, 21.
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Ends, ways, means, friction and research questions
To create a conversation between the different perspectives, we have divided 
the literature into themes which have been connected to the well-known 
strategic studies Ends-Ways-Means-Friction framework. We show how SAP 
ideas both map onto this structure while providing different, in some ways 
thought-provoking means of analysis for these concepts (or using Strachan’s 
criticism – a different language through which to understand its strategic 
literacy).
We take as our point of departure the four cornerstones of the Ends-Ways- 
Means-Friction framework and elaborate on the following research questions: 
The first theme, which engages with the concept of strategic ends, is titled 
Strategy is a Verb, Not a Noun. It has as its research question: How do strategy- 
making practices and processes shape or alter outcomes and end goals? 
The second theme, which engages with strategic ways, is entitled Focus on 
Discourse, Language, and their Performative Effects. It has as its research 
question: How do performative expressions of strategy-making such as dis-
course and language determine or challenge the ways strategies are imple-
mented? The third theme, which engages with strategic means, is entitled 
Tools and Technologies. It has as its research question: How do the physical 
and material tools and technologies available for implementing strategies 
both enable and constrain strategic activity? Finally, the fourth theme, which 
engages with the notion of friction, is entitled Open or Co-creative Strategy. It 
has as its research question: What are the most important elements of open, 
flexible structures which can allow for more effective adaptations to changing 
and unforeseen circumstances? Discussing the SAP literature in this way and 
using it to ask these research questions reveals fruitful areas for future 
scholarly discussion.
We believe that this engagement between strategic studies and SAP has 
also practical implications. Two major strategy documents have just been 
released by the US and UK governments: the US National Security Strategic 
Guidance and the UK Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and 
Foreign Policy. Both documents exhibit similar strengths and weaknesses as 
strategic statements. They provide fascinating glimpses into general direc-
tions of travel such as the UK’s ongoing pivot against spending money on 
traditional ground forces towards investment in cyber security and scientific 
research. They also, through both commission and omission, reveal how the 
governmental structures of the two view global challenges. They work mostly 
as statements of strategic perception – because both are noticeably lacking in 
detail on the specific steps to be taken to achieve their strategic goals. It is 
arguable that in democracies, such reviews when published primarily serve to 
provide transparency in defence budgets and spending cuts and are meant 
for the consumption of the publics whose support remains integral to the 
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purposes of strategy. The problem from a practice perspective is that the 
release of these documents is seen as the main strategic accomplishment; yet 
the future is highly uncertain, and no plan can see five, let alone ten years 
ahead. Moreover, the plans are top-down, high level, and written with a linear 
view of implementation and certain inbuilt assumptions. There is little room 
for emergence, agility, and resilience. Finally, the current approach glosses 
over the interdisciplinary nature of strategic thought: both the US and UK 
plans are simultaneous economic, technological, and defence strategies. 
Indeed, strategic statements released by countries around the world, exem-
plify an almost universal desire by states to upgrade their cyber, space and 
scientific research strengths – all of which will require an increasingly close 
cooperation with a range of technology-based businesses. Japan’s National 
Security Strategy, last updated in 2016 had in its first list of strategic priorities 
the strengthening of ‘cyber security, international counterterrorism, intelli-
gence capabilities, stable use of outer space, and technological capabilities’.7 
To do this the Japanese military will ‘accelerate its efforts’ to work produc-
tively with private firms with expertise in ‘space, cyberspace, electromagnetic 
spectrum, ocean, and science and technology’.8 Given these increasing com-
plexities we aim to provide a strategy vocabulary that matches the practical 
task of crafting strategy.
With these aims, our article proceeds as follows. First, we will provide 
a brief overview of the institutional and intellectual trajectories of organisa-
tional strategy. We will then zoom in on current debates around SAP, intro-
ducing our four major themes with their research questions and discuss how 
they might challenge and change the conversation in traditional strategic 
studies. We will conclude with ideas for future research and opportunities for 
further engagement. Prior to commencing, one caveat: it is not possible to 
describe ‘organisational strategy’ as one body of knowledge within one 
review article. Organisational strategy itself is contested, diverse and too 
elaborate to allow one definite reading. Thus, we provide a necessarily sub-
jective reading with the aim to spark curiosity, not closure.
The big picture: Institutional and intellectual trajectories of 
organisational strategy
Strategy has become firmly established as one of the flagship disciplines in 
business schools. While it traces its origins to military planning, contemporary 
notions of strategic management evolved out of business policy courses in 
business schools in the 1960s and 1970s, and a growing and influential 
7‘National Security Strategy’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/ 
fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html
8‘National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond’, 18 December 2018, 8–9. Available at: 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/pdf/2019boueikeikaku_e.pdf
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consulting industry, particularly in the United States. The Carnegie and Ford 
foundations are not only credited with influencing US foreign policy post-1945 
but also produced studies in 1959 recommending how modern business 
schools should be organised, including with capstone ‘corporate strategy’ 
courses.9 But it was the writings of the business historian Alfred Chandler, 
business leader Alfred Sloan, and business theorist Igor Ansoff that established 
organisational strategy as an academic interest in its own right.10 Ansoff in 
particular credited military practice as well as industrial economics with inform-
ing his work. A conference convened in Pittsburgh in 1978 for scholars to 
gather and discuss developments in strategy research, and the publication 
that followed entitled Strategic Management, is viewed by many as the founda-
tion of strategic management as a discipline in business schools.11
The watershed year, however, came in 1980 with the publication of 
Competitive Strategy by Michael Porter. Porter had a background in industrial 
economics where a main concern was how organisations can gain 
a monopoly position from the perspective of industrial policy.12 He turned 
this concern on its head by arguing that competitive strategy was about 
positioning, and where possible, leveraging powerful industry forces to give 
an organisation a competitive advantage over its rivals. This insight led to 
several influential analytic frameworks and generic strategies that could aid 
strategic managers in achieving superior competitive performance. While this 
‘outside-in’ approach to strategy has remained a mainstay of strategy 
research, more recently it has broadened to incorporate competitive 
dynamics and the impact of a range of issues on competition including 
globalisation, sustainability, and growing stakeholder power.13
Where the ‘outside-in’ approach to strategy focuses on how organisations 
compete within their external environment, an ‘inside-out’ perspective was 
proposed, initially as a complement of, and subsequently as an alternative to 
the positioning perspective with the 1984 publication of the Resource-Based 
View of the Firm.14 Here, the focus was on how organisations can leverage 
unique configurations of tangible and intangible resources as a source of 
sustained competitive advantage. This approach became the dominant strat-
egy paradigm in the 1990s. More specifically, organisations that held config-
urations of resources that are valuable, rare, difficult-to-imitate, and organised 
9Stephen Cummings and David Wilson, Images of Strategy (Oxford: 2003).
10Igor Ansoff, Corporate Strategy: An Analytic Approach to Business Policy for Growth and Expansion 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin 1965); Alfred Chandler, Strategy and Structure. Chapters in the History of the 
American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge: 1962); Alfred P. Sloan, My Years with General Motors 
(London: 1963).
11Dan E. Schendel and Charles Hofer, Strategic Management (Boston: 1979).
12M. E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New York: 1980).
13Ming-Jer Chen and Danny Miller, ‘Reconceptualizing Competitive Dynamics: A Multidimensional 
Framework’, Strategic Management Journal 36 (2015), 758–75.
14Birger Wernerfelt, ‘A Resource-based View of the Firm’, Strategic Management Journal 5/2 (1984), 171– 
80.
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(known as the VRIO framework)15 were more likely to outperform their compe-
titors. The initially rather static portrayal of resources, however, led scholars to 
develop notions of core competencies and dynamic capabilities. Core compe-
tencies are harmonised combinations of resources and skills that distinguish 
organisations in the marketplace and give them competitive advantage. 
Dynamic capabilities are the abilities to build, integrate and reconfigure internal 
competencies to address the quickly changing external environment.16 Notions 
of core competencies and dynamic capabilities brought issues of adaptability, 
agility, learning and entrepreneurial management to the fore of thinking about 
how organisations can nurture and maintain competitive advantage in turbu-
lent environments. The move advocated a shift from a focus on ‘fit’ with a given 
environment, towards the ability to thrive and innovate in turbulent, rapidly 
changing environments.
Where both the early ‘outside-in’ and ‘inside-out’ perspectives on strategy 
focused on strategy ‘content’, in parallel developments in strategic manage-
ment research in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Canada and the United 
Kingdom, scholars were focusing on strategy as a process.17 Following this 
line of inquiry, scholars began challenging the notion that strategy develop-
ment is purely a planned phenomenon, but also emerges through complex 
cultural, political and social dynamics inside and outside the organisation. As 
one of its early proponents Henry Mintzberg suggested, strategy research 
should spend less time imagining how strategy should be made and focus 
more on how strategies actually get made.18 Such a Machiavellian realism put 
attention on practices, processes and routines through which strategy was 
done in companies, often by middle managers, consultants, and aids (as 
opposed to top managers). This focus accelerated a move away from 
a portrayal of strategy as consistently intentional and rational, demarcated 
into distinct phases of formulation and implementation, towards how the 
content of strategies change over time as complex and continuously evolving 
processes of formation embedded in context. Process research into strategy 
also began to shift debates away from more linear and rational conceptuali-
sations of strategy evolution, towards non-linear dynamics incorporating 
chaos, complexity, emotion and unintended consequences.19 More recently, 
a desire to open up these processes to understand precisely what it is that 
15Jay Barney, ‘Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage’, Journal of Management 17/1 
(1991), 99–120.
16C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, ‘The Core Competence of the Corporation’, Harvard Business Review 68/ 
3 (1990), 79–91; David J. Teece, Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen, ‘Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management’, Strategic Management Journal 18/7 (1997), 509–33.
17Andrew Pettigrew, The Awakening Giant. Continuity and Change in Imperial Chemical Industries (Oxford: 
1985).
18Henry Mintzberg, ‘Crafting Strategy’, Harvard Business Review 65 (1987), 66–75.
19Bradley MacKay and R. Chia, ‘Choice, Chance, and Unintended Consequences in Strategic Change: 
A Process Understanding of the Rise and Fall of NorthCo Automotive’, Academy of Management Journal 
56/1 (2013): 208–30.
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strategy practitioners do has led to a focus on the strategic practices 
employed by practitioners, the role that their praxis plays in shaping these 
dynamics, and their aggregation into wider processes.20 Closely allied to the 
‘practice-turn’ in strategic management is an interest in the micro- 
foundations of strategy, or how individual-level factors aggregate into col-
lective, or organisational-wide performance outcomes.
Table 1 provides an overview of some of the most recent reviews of the 
field of organisational strategy. Without attempting to conduct a review of 
reviews the table evidences the plurality of perspectives and the increasing 
significance of internal practices and capabilities for performance.
Critical appreciation of the state of the art
Critically, some of the earlier frameworks were in search of the key to superior 
performance. They assumed that this key can be studied and formalised 
(preferably in models) and then disseminated in books, articles in practi-
tioner-oriented journals, MBA programmes etc. These assumptions have not 
been without critics. For instance, the strategy scholar Powell argued, ‘com-
petitive advantage propositions [. . .] have the especially ironic feature that 
their entities and phenomena only function properly so long as no one 
observes or understands them’.21 This critique echoes Luttwak’s discussion 
of the strategy paradox where a good road turns into a bad road precisely 
because the enemy assumes this is the road to be taken. In this sense, 
a strategy model could be true in a static world in which only one actor 
deploys it, but it turns false once shared.
In response, strategy scholars asked: if the secrets of strategy are available at 
Amazon for a few pounds, how come so many organisations fail?22 The search 
for an answer resulted in the practice approach which had been already 
seeded by process scholars such as Mintzberg and Pettigrew. The practice 
approach went further in analysing the ‘doing’ of strategy, paying close atten-
tion to the work of strategising as ongoing, distributed activity in and across 
organisations. In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss this SAP approach 
and how it could help rejuvenate current conversations in strategic studies. We 
will do so by highlighting four main themes of strategic studies (ends, ways, 
means and friction) and discuss them through the lens of the SAP agenda with 
the aim to reflect on the possibilities they open for strategic studies.
20Robert A. Burgelman et al., ‘Strategy Processes and Practices: Dialogues and Intersections’, Strategic 
Management Journal 39/3 (2018), 531–58.
21Thomas Powell, ‘Competitive advantage: logical and philosophical considerations’, Strategic 
Management Journal 22/9 (2001), 884.
22Richard Whittington, What is Strategy – and Does it Matter? (London: 2000).
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Strategy as practice: Four themes as tools for rethinking military 
strategy
The SAP school of thought took shape around the turn of the 
millennium.23 The basic idea of SAP is to study strategy not as 
a document, plan, or blueprint but as an ongoing activity, as something 
that strategy practitioners do. In short, it turns strategy from a noun into 
a verb – strategising – that is performed, in practice. The promise of this 
turn towards practice is that the analysis of everyday practices, processes, 
routines, and rituals of strategy-making can deliver important clues about 
strategy; and by extension, how it may be done more effectively. In many 
respects, this agenda follows Machiavelli’s realist dictum that we ought to 
analyse what an effective leader actually does to stay in power as 
opposed to debate what an ideal leader ought to do. In what follows, 
we use the key themes of military strategy of ends, ways, means and 
friction as discursive devices to structure and reframe conversations 
between military and organisational strategy.
Theme 1: Strategy is a verb, not a noun
How do strategy-making practices and processes shape or alter outcomes/ 
end goals? The notion of ‘doing’ strategy (its practices and processes) is key to 
the SAP agenda. Much of the empirical work highlights the ‘lived experience’ 
of those involved in strategising.24 The approach dissects the ongoing work 
that goes into thinking, writing, implementing, and re-thinking strategies. For 
instance, MacKay and Chia showed how the ongoing strategy process in 
a North American automotive supplier was patterned by strategic choice 
and chance, resulting in unintended consequences and the ultimate demise 
of the firm.25 In these and other studies, the concept of practice carries much 
of the analytical weight of the agenda. Whittington developed a three-fold 
heuristic to define the meaning of practice: ‘Practices refer to the various 
tools, norms, and procedures of strategy work, from analytical frameworks 
such as Porter’s Five Forces to strategic planning routines such as strategy 
workshops. Praxis refers to the activity involved in strategy-making, for 
example, in strategic planning processes or meetings. Practitioners are all 
23Richard Whittington, ‘Strategy as Practice’, Long Range Planning, 29/5 (1996), 731–35; Eero Vaara, and 
Richard Whittington, ‘Strategy-as-Practice: Taking Social Practices Seriously’, Academy of Management 
Annals 6/1 (2012), 285–336.
24Dalvir Samra-Fredericks, ‘Strategizing as Lived Experience and Strategists’ Everyday Efforts to Shape 
Strategic Direction’, Journal of Management Studies 40/1 (2003); Brad MacKay et al., ’Strategy-in- 
Practices: A process philosophical approach to understanding strategy emergence and organizational 
outcomes’, Human Relations 74/9 (2021), 1337–1339.
25Bradley MacKay and Robert Chia, ‘Choice, Chance, and Unintended Consequences in Strategic Change’.
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those involved in, or seeking to influence, strategy-making’.26 More critically, 
scholars proposed to anchor the notion of practice in Foucauldian tradition27 
suggesting a focus on how practices constitute strategy.
This focus on practices includes studying sites of strategising such as 
retreats, workshops, or meetings where strategy work is done. The idea 
here is that these sites condition actors’ capacities to think strategically. 
Equally, time is an important structuring device that shapes how strategy 
work is accomplished. Planning cycles or engagement with history are impor-
tant constraints or enablers for strategy development.28 Last but not least, 
tools such as maps or digital visualisations are important building blocks of 
strategy practices that bring specific affordances.29 The basic claim of the 
practice approach is that only through understanding spaces, temporal 
structures and artefacts do we arrive at an understanding of how strategy 
work is accomplished and how it becomes effective.
Possible implications for strategic ends
The practice agenda suggests such a focus on shifting ends as part and parcel 
of dynamic strategising. Within strategic studies itself, there are diverging 
views of what an end means. For instance, as Tom Mahnken points out, while 
Clausewitz held that destroying the enemy’s army most often leads to victory, 
Sun Tzu was more interested in attacking the enemy’s strategy and their 
alliances before seeking to destroy the opponent’s army ranks.30 The SAP 
approach invites an anthropological sensibility by understanding strategists 
as a ‘tribe’ with its own language and practices that in turn shape their way of 
defining possible ends and getting out of dead ends. Thus, one of the most 
intriguing aspects of the SAP literature is its focus on how ends in and of 
themselves are dynamic. Ends can change rapidly in response to the unex-
pected, and the practices of instituting strategy need to be able to adjust to 
such changes to be truly effective. In such a world, practices determine 
strategy and strategic ends in a way that is more profound than the stated 
aim of a conflict when it commences. In the First World War, when decisive 
victory proved elusive, military planners failed to effectively strategise how 
they could use the material and manpower at their disposal. Michael Geyer 
has argued that the absence of a particular strategy meant that the internal 
and external antagonisms unleashed by the decision to go to war 
26Vaara and Whittington, ‘Strategy-as-Practice’, 290.
27Chris Carter et al., ‘Strategy as Practice’? Strategic Organisation 6/1 (2008), 83–99.
28Sarah Kaplan and Wanda Orlikowski, ‘Temporal Work in Strategy Making’, Organization Science 24/4 
(2013), 965–95; Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz, ‘Toward a Theory of Using History Authentically: 
Historicizing in the Carlsberg Group’, Administrative Science Quarterly 62/4 (2017), 657–97.
29Martin Eppler and Ken Platts, ‘Visual Strategizing: the Systematic Use of Visualization in the Strategic- 
Planning Process’, Long Range Planning 42/1 (2009), 42–74.
30Thomas Mahnken, ‘Strategic Theory’ in Baylis et al., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction 
to Strategic Studies (Oxford: 2016), 62.
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perpetuated the conflict on the strength of micro politics and micro 
strategies with far-reaching repercussions.31 This is also a lesson that 
the USA is only now trying to come to terms with as the ‘War on 
Terror’ ends one of its most important phases. The US withdrawal from 
Afghanistan has highlighted the reality that, whatever the supposed aims 
of the US when the administration of George W. Bush launched the US 
led invasion in 2001 (and even at the time these remain obscured and 
open to debate), the reality of the aim today has resulted in something 
rather different. In many ways, it was the USA’s inability to systematically 
interrogate and adjust the aims of their war in Afghanistan in the face of 
growing quagmire that left the country with a terrible binary choice; stay 
in a permanent war or abandon a weak government and see it collapse 
(as it just has at the time of writing).
Theme 2: Focus on discourse, language and their performative effects
How do performative expressions of strategy-making such as discourse and 
language determine or challenge the ways strategies are implemented? This 
question problematises the ways in which strategy is accomplished. In 
response, SAP focuses on how discourse and language structure work on 
strategy.32 The underpinning assumption is that strategy work is first and 
foremost a linguistic accomplishment.33 Strategy can be analysed as 
a language game that is distinct from other modes of making sense of the 
future.34 It is an albeit costly form of storytelling in which narratives are 
crafted to make sense of an uncertain future and an equally ambiguous 
past.35 Rather than being a decision-making tool, strategy is analysed as 
storytelling that rationalises and legitimises specific courses of action.36 
Here, discourse is analysed as one of the main linkages between power and 
knowledge: through framing challenges and opportunities, weaknesses and 
strengths, short and long-term, etc., strategy work enacts ways of thinking 
about the future. Critically, the specific way of seeing engendered by strategy 
might have performative effects, i.e., strategy brings about the reality it 
31Michael Geyer, ‘German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945 , in Peter Paret et al., 
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: 1986), 533.
32Christopher Fenton and Ann Langley, ‘Strategy as Practice and the Narrative Turn’, Organization Studies 
32/9 (2011); Martin Giraudeau ‘The Drafts of Strategy: Opening up Plans and their Uses’, Long Range 
Planning 41/3 (2008).
33Saku Mantere, ‘What is Organizational Strategy? A Language-based View’, Journal of Management 
Studies, 50/ 8 (2013).
34Liliana Doganova and Martin Kornberger, ‘Strategy’s Futures’, Futures 125 (2021).
35David Barry and Michael Elmes, ‘Strategy Retold: Toward a Narrative View of Strategic Discourse’, 
Academy of Management Review 22/2 (1997), 429–452.
36Küpers et al. ‘Strategy as Storytelling: A Phenomenological Collaboration’, Journal of Management 
Inquiry 22/1 (2013), 83–100.
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envisioned through its process.37 This performative effect is at play in self- 
fulfilling prophecies as well as other forms of recursivity where the future 
shapes the present.38
On a micro-level, SAP investigated plans as a ‘genre’ that follows an 
inherent logic (rather than responding to external necessity).39 The genre 
drives the argument and constrains the imagination of the strategist as their 
work would not be recognisable if it did not adhere to the discursive rules of 
the genre. Equally, metaphors (such as the Darwinian struggle for survival; 
disruption; or in military terms: the Cold War dominos or the Axis of Evil) 
pattern strategic thought and invite certain conclusions whilst making others 
seem far-fetched.40 Metaphors and other tropes have been analysed as forms 
of rhetoric and ambiguity that are not necessarily detrimental to strategy 
work.41 Ambiguity in strategic planning, for instance, has been described as 
a double-edged sword: while it may initially accommodate different, even 
conflicting perspectives, the resulting effects further down the line might 
lead to overextension and instigate a recurring pattern of adjustments.42
Strategy is a discourse with which those in power extend their reach into 
the future. Strategy is a way to divide the world into friends and foes, 
opportunities and threats, strengths and weaknesses etc. As a linguistically 
informed strategy analysis showed, to name things is to exercise power over 
them: indeed, by categorising the environment in a specific way (e.g., axis of 
evil; domino theory; various framings of game theory, etc.), we construct 
a specific strategic reality – a reality that always could be otherwise, and 
hence a reality that warrants critical scrutiny. This point highlights that one of 
the fundamental tasks of scholarship is to speak truth to power.
This critical edge is part of the SAP school of strategic thought. For 
instance, Knights and Morgan posited that strategy is a discourse that formats 
reality in specific ways and ascribes specific subject positions to organisa-
tional managers.43 In a further seminal contribution, Oakes et al. empirically 
described business planning as a form of ‘pedagogy’ that forced professional 
staff to submit to the language game of strategy.44 Framing of problems and 
37D. Knights and G. Morgan, ‘Corporate Strategy, Organizations, and Subjectivity: A Critique’, 
Organization Studies, 12/2 (1991): 251–73.
38Martin Kornberger and Stewart Clegg ‘Strategy as Performative Practice: The Case of Sydney 2030 , 
Strategic Organization 9/2 (2011), 136–62.
39Francis Cornut et al., ‘The Strategic Plan as a Genre’, Discourse and Communication 6/1 (2012).
40Loizos Heracleous and Claus Jacobs, ‘Crafting Strategy: The Role of Embodied Metaphors’, Long Range 
Planning 41/3 (2008), 309–25.
41John Sillince et al., ‘Shaping Strategic Action through the Rhetorical Construction and Exploitation of 
Ambiguity’, Organization Science 23/3 (2012), 630–50.
42Chahrazad Abdallah and Ann Langley, ‘The Double Edge of Ambiguity in Strategic Planning’, Journal of 
Management Studies 51/2 (2014), 235–64.
43Penny Dick and David Collings, ‘Discipline and Punish? Strategy Discourse, Senior Manager Subjectivity 
and Contradictory Power Effects’, Human Relations 67/12 (2014), 1513–36.
44Leslie Oakes et al., ‘Business Planning as Pedagogy: Language and Control in a Changing Institutional 
Field’, Administrative Science Quarterly 43/2 (1998), 257–92.
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legitimacy of solutions occurred in the language of strategy, casting the 
world in rivals, opportunities, and weaknesses. Similarly, Kornberger and 
Clegg have argued that strategy-making in the context of public administra-
tion was a powerful device to shift frames of reference, mobilise the public, 
and articulate political will.45 Fenton and Langley summarised much of this 
critical work when they pointed out that strategy narratives ‘select and 
prioritise’ – indeed, this is their ostensible managerial purpose.46 However, 
as they achieve this, they also implicitly express, construct and reproduce 
legitimate power structures, organisational roles, and ideologies.47 Processes 
of framing in which meanings are bestowed upon events as well as language 
are key to understanding how strategic realities are defined.
Possible implications for strategic ways
The single most important task for strategy, Strachan has argued, is to under-
stand the nature of the war it is addressing and then, to manage and direct 
that war.48 In practice, therefore, strategy is inherently pragmatic. Distinct 
from wartime, however, where strategy is primarily concerned with interac-
tion with an enemy and the pursuit of a chosen set of ends in the face of 
determined opposition, peacetime strategy takes a different form. It is proac-
tive and driven by language with the aim of matching means and ends as 
anticipated in the near future.49 Based on SAP’s focus on discourse, language 
and their performative effects military strategy can analyse how the language 
an institution employs may shape its perception of reality. In extreme cases, 
this can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. This focus is often overlooked in 
strategic studies, which can imply an assumed rationality or clarity in its 
linguistic construction of strategic plans that does not, in fact, exist. This is 
particularly the case with strategy documents, which often lay out seemingly 
rational, comprehensive plans that are flawed or destined to fail because of 
linguistic deceptions. For instance, public strategic reviews released to great 
fanfare, such as the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, 
Development and Foreign Policy, often have ambitious strategic goals with 
stunted strategic ways. For instance, in its strategic review, the UK govern-
ment said the nation would aim to be a high-tech superpower in the next 
decade but provided little useful language on how this was to be achieved 
(beyond the spending of vague sums of money). This is at least better than 
instances where the language is entirely deceptive. If a certain credit could be 
paid to Donald Trump, it is in his disinterest in pretending that strategic ways 
45Kornberger and Clegg, ‘Strategy as Performative Practice’.
46Fenton and Langley, ‘Strategy as Practice’.
47Dennis Mumby, ‘The Political Function of Narrative in Organizations’, Communication Monographs 54/2 
(1987), 113–27.
48Strachan, The Direction of War, 103.
49Wess Mitchell, The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire (Princeton, NJ: 2018), 73.
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were in the ‘national’ interest as opposed to what was considered best for his 
personal or political fortunes. The state has an entire bureaucracy in control of 
language to create ways that are supposedly serving the national interest, 
when indeed the whole concept is open to question. If we start questioning 
such linguistic constructs, we can be analytically more clear and perhaps 
morally more honest about what our strategies are and how they are sup-
posed to achieve their aims.
Theme 3: Focus on tools and technologies
How do the material tools and technologies available for crafting and implement-
ing strategies both enable and constrain strategic activity? SAP does not depict 
strategic thinking as an abstract, Cartesian form of cognition; rather, the practice 
approach suggests strategy making to be facilitated, mediated, and thus struc-
tured, by tools and technologies.50 These tools form the material base of how 
strategies are made.51 For instance, Kaplan analysed the Microsoft PowerPoint 
software, commonly used by organisational strategists as part and parcel of the 
‘epistemic machinery of strategy culture’.52 In her study, she dissects how the 
technology affords certain forms of ‘collaboration and cartography’, thus provid-
ing boundary conditions for the strategy process and its outcomes. In a further 
contribution, Knight and colleagues studied how PowerPoint creates ‘strategic 
visibility’: here, the technology is a tool that frames what matters and what 
remains excluded; such framing is an inextricable part and parcel of the strategic 
process in which power and knowledge are brought to bear on a specific 
situation.53
This relation between tools and technologies of strategy making and their 
power effects has been discussed as performativity: the core idea is that tools 
format the world in a specific way, so they propose themselves as the answer.54 
Thus organisational strategy suggests that charts, maps, diagrams and other 
visualisations do not just analyse the world as it is; but as they format the world 
into certain categories, they subtly structure the space in which options present 
themselves.55 In so doing, models of the world become models for the world.56
50Paula Jarzabkowski and Sarah Kaplan, ‘Strategy Tools-in-Use: A Framework for Understanding 
“Technologies of Rationality” in Practice’, Strategic Management Journal 36/4 (2015), 537–558.
51Stéphanie Dameron et al., ‘Materializing Strategy and Strategizing Materials: Why Matter Matters’, 
British Journal of Management 26/1 (2015), S1-S12.
52Sarah Kaplan, ‘Strategy and PowerPoint: An Inquiry into the Epistemic Culture and Machinery of 
Strategy Making’, Organization Science 22/2 (2011), 320–346.
53Eric Knight. et al., ‘The Power of PowerPoint: A Visual Perspective on Meaning Making in Strategy’, 
Strategic Management Journal 39/3 (2018), 894–921.
54David Knights and Glenn Morgan, ‘Corporate Strategy, Organizations, and Subjectivity: A Critique’, 
Organisation Studies 12/2 (1991), 251–73; Kornberger and Clegg, ‘Strategy as Performative Practice’.
55Eppler and Platts ‘Visual Strategizing’.
56James Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed (New 
Haven: 1999).
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A further implication of the emphasis on strategy tools and technologies is 
a reflection on the notion of strategy agency and actor hood. Rather than 
assuming strategy as resulting from strategists’ will and representation, the 
practice approach analyses strategy as an outcome of distributed agency. The 
‘capacity for strategy is an effect of a more or less stable arrangement of material’, 
and strategic action is a ‘collective property’, as science and technology scholars 
Callon and Law argued.57 The practice agenda suggests that tools and technol-
ogies connect a distributed set of actors and institutions, de facto acting as 
boundary spanners that enable specific forms of communication and 
collaboration.58
Possible implications for strategic means
The interrelationship between the tools and technologies available as a means to 
achieve strategic aims has been vital in strategic history. Eighteenth-century 
Habsburg leaders, for strategic more than commercial or artistic purposes, 
devoted significant resources to the creation of maps as well as the institutional 
and scientific infrastructure for advanced cartography.59 Maps helped the leader-
ship visualise and calculate the range of resources at their disposal, fight battles 
effectively, and reach favourable deals in postwar negotiations. The Habsburgs 
thus leveraged the means in natural and human resources to make their empire 
a unified polity and achieve victory over Prussia. In the case of the Second World 
War, be it the strategic bombing of Germany or Japan, the strategies were to 
a large degree determined by the technologies or tools at hand. Too often, 
however, strategic studies are based on the premise that the means can be 
adapted through ways to achieve an aim, when in reality the means and tools 
themselves determine strategic choice. The SAP literature has delved into that 
conundrum in detail, which could help in the future of cyber strategy for instance. 
The tools of cyber conflict are themselves various and determinative – stretching 
from open access websites such as Facebook to spread disinformation to AI 
controlled platforms that will soon be programmed to act on their own. Hence, 
to understand the future of cyber strategy, it is essential to recognise that tools 
have considerable potential to determine strategies and how they are crafted.
Theme 4: Open strategy and co-creative ecosystems
What are the most important elements of open, flexible structures 
which can allow for more effective adaptations to changing and unfore-
seen circumstances? As part of the SAP agenda, open strategy has been 
57Michel Callon and John Law, ‘After the Individual in Society: Lessons on Collectivity from Science, 
Technology and Society’, Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie 22/2 (1997), 
165–82.
58Andreas Paul Spee and Paula Jarzabkowski, ‘Strategy Tools as Boundary Objects’, Strategic Organization 
7/2 (2009), 223–232.
59Mitchell, Grand Strategy of the Hapsburg Empire, 43.
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defined as ‘a practice that involves upper echelon and non-upper- 
echelon organisational members as well as stakeholders from outside 
the organisation’.60 It is premised on the idea that strategy may be 
a collective endeavour, harnessing rather than restricting strategic con-
tributions from practitioners located across a wide organisational and 
institutional ecosystem. Consequently, it eschews a more traditional 
view of strategy work as residing within the exclusive remit of the 
most senior executives or top management team, i.e., the CEO (or the 
general) and their direct reports. Open strategy has received growing 
attention from organisational strategy scholars in recent years, mirroring 
the rise in popularity of open and co-creative organisational forms in 
practice such as Wikimedia.61
Commonly enabled by technology platforms including the increas-
ingly pervasive communication services such as Zoom and Microsoft 
Teams in addition to the progressively influential social media sites, 
open strategy can imbue a range of benefits oftentimes lacking in 
more traditional, hierarchical topologies.62 Specifically, it may help in 
breaking-down conventional participatory boundaries, increasing the 
diversity of strategy’s practitioners and reducing information asymme-
tries amongst stakeholders both internal and external to the 
organisation.63 Improving practitioner involvement enables skillsets 
and experiences to be leveraged in ways that may previously have 
been either under-utilised or omitted entirely and a promise of 
‘increased transparency and inclusion regarding strategic issues’.64 
Organisations can thus develop more holistic understandings of their 
internal and external environments, and strengthen their ability to 
recognise and strategically respond to emergent events.
In shifting the dominant focus of strategy away from abstract macro- 
level phenomena towards a more holistic understanding encompassing 
the micro activities of strategy work enacted by a growingly diverse 
range of practitioners, a myriad of new methodological, conceptual, and 
interdisciplinary avenues are accessible to the scholarly and practitioner 
communities.65
60Asin Tavakoli et al., ‘Open strategy: Literature Review, Re-analysis of Cases and Conceptualisation as 
a practice’, Journal of Strategic Information Systems 26/3 (2017), 178.
61Laura Dobusch et al., ‘Closing for the Benefit of Openness? The Case of Wikimedia’s Open Strategy 
Process’, Organization Studies 40/3 (2019), 343–370.
62João Baptista et al., ‘Social Media and the Emergence of Reflexiveness as a New Capability for Open 
Strategy’, Long Range Planning 50/3 (2017), 322–36.
63Richard Whittington, Opening Strategy: Professional Strategists and Practice Change, 1960 to Today 
(Oxford: 2019).
64Julia Hautz et al., ‘Open Strategy’, Long Range Planning 50/3 (2017), 298.
65Jeffrey Hughes and Joe McDonagh, ‘SISP as Practice: De-isolating SISP Activity across Multiple Levels’, 
Journal of Strategic Information Systems 30/2 (2021).
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Possible Implications for Strategic Friction
Scholars have recognised strategy as an essential link between the military 
and policy worlds but also, as a dialogue lacking in equity.66 This is so because 
policy must ultimately determine the direction of war but must also adjust 
itself to what is possible with the means available. Edward Luttwak concep-
tualised strategy on multiple horizontal and vertical levels which, he argued, 
constantly interacted with and reacted to each other.67 This ‘logic of strategy’ 
unfolded in two dimensions: vertically, with the interplay of different levels of 
conflict, such as tactical, operational, technical and higher, amongst which 
there is no harmony, and horizontally, with the contentions of adversaries 
who sought to oppose, deflect, and reverse each other’s moves making 
strategy paradoxical. A recent discussion in SAP literature has been on the 
importance of integrating outside factors, some largely outside of institu-
tional control and the reach and reality of strategic planning (let alone 
imagination). This ability to cope with the unexpected and challenging 
Clausewitzian form of friction requires the construction of a flexible strategic 
structure. SAP argues that the best way to contend with such friction is to 
have in place an open-minded and diverse culture that can best understand 
what these unexpected challenges represent and how to respond to them.68 
This runs counter in many ways to traditional realist thinking which is based 
on power balances and calculations based on force. As Germany before the 
First World War demonstrates, and perhaps China today, trying to force 
a strategy into life based almost entirely on the reality of the application of 
national power or force can be counterproductive. In both cases, great 
powers, because they were not flexible enough to understand and integrate 
the concerns of others, ended up knitting together powerful coalitions to 
oppose their strategic plans. For instance, the British, French and Russians 
came together to oppose Germany before 1914, and more recently, the USA, 
India, Japan, Australia and Vietnam are acting increasingly together to con-
tain China. Relying on force alone to achieve a successful strategy can be 
counterproductive. In both cases, being flexible and incorporating outside 
concerns would have benefited the strategic actor.
Future research: How organisational strategy challenges and may 
change security studies
Mark Twain once wrote that ‘to a man with a hammer, every problem looks 
like a nail’. This observation underlines the temptations and traps that bede-
viled the use of military forces in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries; the 
66David Lonsdale, Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy (London: 2007), 6.
67Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: 2003), xii.
68Martin Kornberger et al., ‘Exploring the Long-term Effect of Strategy Work: The Case of Sustainable 
Sydney 2030ʹ. Urban Studies, 0042098020979546.
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instinctive need to use them to try and solve difficult problems and in doing 
so often making things far worse. Strategy properly understood should be 
more about limiting the use of military power and the de-escalation of crises. 
Too often, however, it results in the employment of military force in conflicts. 
In this way, strategy has evolved into a tool to allow those in power to try and 
impose solutions on a problem using military forces in entirely inappropriate 
ways often leading to disasters from the US in Vietnam and the USSR in 
Afghanistan during the Cold War to what seemed a never-ending globalised 
‘War on Terror’ that the USA waged until it evacuated its troops out of 
Afghanistan, leaving the country and its peoples in a rather disparate state. 
To address these failures, we have to address the way we think and conceive 
of strategy. Many of the issues that management and organisation theorists 
have identified in the SAP literature open fresh, perhaps even challenging 
perspectives that can help spur dialogue with more traditional, state-based, 
military strategy makers and scholars. Much of this dialogue concerns the 
importance of understanding and responding to the unexpected and unin-
tended which can have profound influence on the ends, ways, means and 
friction of strategy making.
Future research in military strategy could study the actual practices, pro-
cedures, routines, and rituals of strategy work: what do strategy practices look 
like? How have they evolved over time? What are their effects? Who are the 
practitioners that play the role of experts in strategy making processes? What 
knowledge do they bring? Which discourses, which metaphors (think again 
axis of evil, war on terror’) dominate strategic thought? What types of genres 
(e.g., national strategy, grand strategy, doctrines, manuals) delimit the space 
for strategic thought? How do new forms and formats for strategy making 
evolve and gain legitimacy? With regards to space and time, questions to 
study could include the temporality (frequency) of strategy, the sequencing 
of strategic ‘episodes’ (meetings) as well as the spaces for strategy making: 
are strategies discussed in situation rooms during crises, or in government 
retreats, corporate think tanks or NGO arenas? What are the tools and 
technologies that underpin strategy making? What performative effects do 
these tools have? How do new technologies (such as social media) change 
strategy-making capacity? What are the benefits of a more open and inclusive 
approach to military strategy? Which technologies could be utilised to enable 
open forms of military strategising? How could external partners be facili-
tated through more collaborative approaches to military strategy? How could 
open forms of strategy affect communications both between and across 
military ranks? What are the security considerations particular to more open 
approaches to military strategy? What are the ‘dark sites’ of strategy? What 
issues, which people, are silenced in the processes and practices of strategis-
ing? What futures are imagined and mobilised to change the present?
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These concerns, well rehearsed in the SAP agenda, also invite methodolo-
gical reflections. Rather than looking at strategy documents or plans, 
a practice agenda suggests looking at their making: in how far does the set 
of practices that result in ‘a strategy’ pattern this strategy? How could 
practices change to create the conditions for more desirable outcomes? 
Answering these central questions means engaging with the ‘how’ of strategy 
work, deploying the methods of qualitative social inquiry and fieldwork. It 
means bringing the sensibility of the anthropologist to the making of strat-
egy. Critically, the SAP approach can help increase the researchers’ sensibility 
towards this relationship between politics and strategy by analysing the 
implicit power relationships connecting strategy making and its effects. SAP 
can help to understand how this power is created, sustained and what its 
(unintended) consequences are or can be. The locus here is not on the power 
effect of a plan or a doctrine executed; rather, the realisation that the locus of 
power is backstage, often hidden, and working through practices, structures, 
languages, metaphors, technologies, and other practices of strategising.
Last but not least, SAP suggests a specific ethos of research: strategy 
research is not at the service of those in power; nor is its task to develop 
‘better’ strategies (as one actor’s better strategy might be another actor’s 
decreasing room to manoeuvre). Rather, SAP research is critical in that it 
points out the unintended effects of strategy work and it does not shy away 
from speaking truth to power.
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